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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This Court's jurisdiction is based on Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2-2(2) and (5), 78-2a-4 and Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appellant Glen J. Ellis is appealing from an adverse ruling by 
the Utah Court of Appeals which sustained the Third District Court and 
Utah State Retirement Board in denying Ellis a disability retirement 
benefit. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1- Is Ellis eligible for a disability retirement benefit under 
either U.C.A. § 49-10-28 or § 49-9a-8? 
2- To what extent may the Legislature modify and substitute 
benefits in a retirement system and apply those modifications and sub-
stitutions to persons who have not met all the conditions precedent to 
receiving a retirement benefit? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES 
1- Article 1, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution. 
"No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligations of contracts shall be passed." 
2- Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-4 - See Argument Point II for text. 
3- Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-8 - See Argument Point II for text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Nature of the Case. 
This case involves a claim by a local government employee for 
disability retirement benefits under Utah disability and retirement 
statutes. The employee, Glen J. Ellis, argues that he is eligible for 
a disability benefit under a statutory provision which the administrator 
of the disability program, the Utah State Retirement Board, claims does 
not apply to Ellis. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts. 
Following the Utah State Retirement Board's denial of Ellis' 
request for a disability benefit, Ellis commenced legal action in the 
Fourth District Court, then changed to the Third District Court pursuant 
to a motion made by Respondent. 
The Third District Court granted Respondent Board's Motion to 
Dismiss and denied Ellis' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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Ellis then appealed to the Utah State Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed the lower court decision. Ellis subsequently filed a Petition 
for Rehearing with the Court of Appeals, which was denied. 
Ellis finally petitioned for, and was granted, a writ of Certiorari 
by the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The sequence of legislative enactments leading to the controversy 
in question, and the history of Ellis' participation in the retirement 
and disability systems, provide the basis for the determination of this 
case. 
Prior to July 1, 1983, provisions of the Utah State Retirement Act 
governed eligibility requirements for receiving a disability benefit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-1 et seq. 
On July 1, 1983, a new disability retirement program, "The Utah 
Public Employees1 Disability Act" became effective and governed all 
disabilities which occurred on or after July 1, 1983. Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-9a-l et seq. 
Glen Ellis was employed by Provo City and was covered by the Utah 
State Retirement Act until January 1, 1985, when he elected to exempt 
himself from coverage under the system as permitted for certain local 
government employees pursuant to law. 
On April 28, 1986, Ellis applied for a disability retirement under 
the provisions of the Utah State Retirement Act. 
On February 16, 1987, after a hearing on Ellis' request for a disa-
bility benefit, the Utah State Retirement Board, through its executive 
officer, notified Ellis that he was not eligible for either: 
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1- benefits under the pre-1983 Retirement Act disability provi-
sions, since his disability was in 1986, three years after the new 
Disability Act became effective, or 
2- benefits under the new Disability Act, since Provo City, Ellis' 
employer, had exercised its statutory option and elected not to partici-
pate in coverage under the new Disability Act. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Ellis is not eligible for a disability benefit under the pre-July 
1, 1983 Retirement Act, since (a) his alleged disability occurred in 
1986 and he continued to work at his job for several months after seeking 
disability, and (b) Ellis had exempted himself from the Retirement Act 
in 1985. 
Ellis is not eligible for a disability benefit under the new 
Disability Act, effective July 1, 1983, since (a) he does not meet the 
new eligibility requirements under that Act, and (b) his employing unit 
elected not to participate in the new Act, and no contributions were made 
to provide coverage. 
Since Ellis has not satisfied all the conditions precedent to 
receiving a retirement benefit, his rights are not vested to the extent 
that the Legislature cannot make reasonable adjustments to those 
benefits (including the eligibility conditions for obtaining those 
benefits), and apply them to Ellis and all others similarly situated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. SINCE ELLIS" DISABILITY OCCURRED IN 1986, THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH PUBLIC EMPLOYEES DISABILITY ACT, 
WHICH APPLIES TO ALL DISABILITIES OCCURRING ON OR AFTER 
JULY 1, 1983, GOVERN HIS DISABILITY BENEFITS. ELLIS IS 
INELIGIBLE FOR A BENEFIT UNDER THAT ACT. 
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The provisions of the 1983 Disability Act. which governed the 
disposition of this case in the Utah Court of Appeals, provide: 
§ 49-9a-4. All employers participating in the Utah State 
Retirement System may cover their employees under this act. 
Nothing in this act shall require any political subdivision 
or educational institution to be covered by this act. 
§ 49-9a-8. All covered disabilities with a date of disability 
on or after the effective date of this act shall be administered 
under the provisions of Chapter 10, Title 49. In no event, may 
a disability be covered under both Chapter 10, Title 49 and this 
act. (The effective date of the act was July 1, 1983. Laws of 
Utah 1983, Ch. 223, § 2). 
Ellis claimed disability in 1986. His employer, Provo City, had 
exercised its statutory option under § 49-9a-4 and had elected not to 
participate in the disability plan offered by the 1983 Disability Act. 
Yet, despite these facts, Ellis asserts, and would have this Court hold, 
that since the Legislature did not expressly repeal the disability 
benefits offered by the Retirement Act under Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-28 
(1981) when it enacted the 1983 Disability Act, that he should be 
allowed to retire under the Retirement Act, even though it is only for 
those whose disabilities commenced prior to July 1, 1983. 
The Court of Appeals understood the ramifications of this disturb-
ing argument and offered a clear analysis of the interrelationship of 
the disability plans: 
"Thus, in 1983 the Legislature, by clear express 
language provided that two disability retirement 
systems would co-exist in Utah. The earlier 1967 
Retirement Act would continue to cover disabili-
ties commencing before the effective date of the 
1983 Disability Act. However, all those whose 
disabilities commenced after the 1983 Disability 
Act became effective would be governed by the 
later Disability Act." (See Opinion, Exhibit 
"A" Page 3, paragraph 3.) 
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Thus, the 1983 Disability Act governs Ellis1 disability retirement 
benefits, and under that Act, Ellis is ineligible for benefits. First, 
Provo City elected not to participate in the plan, as allowed by Utah 
Code Ann. § 49-9a-4 and established its own disability program for its 
employees with the money it saved from not contributing to either of 
the disability programs offered under Title 49, Chapters 9a and 10. 
In any event, even if Provo City had participated in the plan, Appellant 
would still be ineligible because he was not "totally disabled" as 
required by the Act, a fact conceded by Ellis in the courts below. (See 
Opinion, page 1.) 
While not determinative of the outcome of this petition, the 
Respondent Board offers some observations on certain allegations made 
by Ellis. 
First; he argues that the repeal of § 49-10-28 has resulted in a 
windfall to the board "which no longer has to pay out anything for 
disability retirement." This argumentative statement is clearly 
specious. All disability retirees who properly met the requirements 
of § 49-10-28; i.e., they were disabled prior to January 1, 1983, con-
tinue to receive disability retirement payments from the board from the 
contributions made to that plan. Second, his characterizations of a 
legislative recodification of retirement laws and other amendments 
effectuated in the 1987 General Session (H.B. 150) as "vacillations of 
the Retirement Board" (Brief of Appellant P. 9) serve no useful purpose 
here. 
-6-
POINT II. ELLIS HAS NOT SATISFIED ALL THE CONDITIONS 
PRECEDENT TO RECEIVING A DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFIT. 
HIS RIGHTS TO THE BENEFIT ARE THEREFORE NOT VESTED AND 
THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE SYSTEM MAY BE REASON-
ABLY ALTERED BY LEGISLATIVE ACTION. 
Ellis argues that he has a contractual vested right to a disability 
benefit under the pre-1983 law pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-28. 
But since he was, by his own admission, not disabled in 1983, he is in 
essence arguing that the Legislature had no right to enact legislation 
taking away his right to a disability retirement benefit under the 
Retirement Act. This is so although Appellant conceded in answer to 
a direct question from the District Court (Judge Noel) that the 
Legislature could do so but it was done by Mr. Hunsaker. 
There is no question that if Ellis had met all the conditions for 
obtaining a disability retirement benefit under the Retirement Act his 
retirement would have contractually "vested", and this case would have 
been resolved under Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-8 at the administrative 
level, but Ellis neyer did meet all the conditions for obtaining the 
disability benefit under the Retirement Act and his disability did not 
commence prior to July 1, 1983, and the date of the commencement of 
disability is a condition for receiving a disability benefit. 
The Court of Appeals in this case offers an interesting analysis 
of the two conflicting lines of authority governing the rights of 
employees under retirement systems. Utah numbers itself among those 
states which adhere to the contractual line of authority. Beginning 
with Driggs v. Utah Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 142 P.2d 
657 (1943), the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that when an 
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employee has satisfied all conditions precedent to receiving his bene-
fits, then the employee has a "vested right" in those benefits provided 
by law at the time of retirement and subsequent legislative enactments 
cannot reduce or diminish that benefit. See Hansen v. Public Employees 
Retirement System Board of Administration, 122 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 
597 (1952); Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers1 Retirement 
Commission, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 947 (1952). 
Most recently, this Court had the opportunity to uphold these prin-
ciples in Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Board, (No. 20734, filed 
September 19, 1988) wherein the Court concluded an analysis of the 
Legislature's right to modify pension statutes of retired members of 
the Public Safety Retirement System, Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-1 et seq, 
(Supp. 1985), with the following statement: 
"The State may not rescind or modify its 
offer after it has been accepted and all 
conditions have been satisfied. Id^ at 8. 
Those other jurisdictions adhering to the "contractual" theory of deter-
mining employee rights agree with this analysis. See e.g. in Re State 
Employees' Pension Plan, 364 A.2d 1228 (Del. 1976); and Miles v. 
Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System, 548 S.W. 2d 299 (Tenn. 1977). 
Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that reasonable modifica-
tions and alterations of the retirement system are acceptable under the 
contractual view, as is the case here: 
"Under the contractual view, state legislatures 
may reasonably alter the terms or modify the 
retirement system to improve it or keep it on a 
sound basis prior to retirement for the purposes 
of maintaining the integrity of the system." 
(Opinion P. 6) 
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Utah law is thus settled on this issue. Since Ellis did not 
satisfy all the conditions precedent for a disability benefit under 
the Retirement Act, his rights are not vested. The Legislature is thus 
permitted to modify, or as is the case here, provide a substantial sub-
stitute for, the disability benefits under the Retirement Act, and apply 
its provisions to Ellis and all others similarly situated. As noted in 
Respondent's Brief before the Court of Appeals, although Appellant did 
raise the question of legislative authority to amend or change the bene-
fits for those already in a system, he did not brief or argue these 
matters at any level of Court proceedings below. Indeed, he specifically 
waived them in answer to a direct question from the District Judge, as 
heretofore noted. He should not now be allowed to seek advantage on a 
question he waived and hence has not been properly briefed or argued below. 
SUMMARY 
The Court of Appeals has issued an opinion which is consistent with 
well established precedent in this and other jurisdiction which espouse 
the "contractual" view determining rights to retirement benefits. 
Ellis has no right to a disability benefit under either Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-10-28, or § 49-9a-8, since his rights are not vested in the 
Retirement Act and he does not meet the eligibility requirements of the 
Disability Act. 
Ellis has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MarkU. Madsen" 
Attorney for Respondent 
Utah State Retirement Board 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Respondent's Brief to Glen J. Ellis, Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, 60 East 100 South, Suite 102, P. 0. Box 1097, Provo, Utah 
84603 and deliver 10 copies to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court on 
this / W ^ day of December, 1988. 
I ^ * » * > J « • •> •« j? 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Glen J. Ellis, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Utah State Retirement Board, 
Defendant and Respondent* 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Davidson. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 870252-CA 
F I L E D 
(cA&sA 
BILLINGS, Judge: Tirfiothy M. Shoaw *~<*+***m 
C/rk of tfto Court 
.&.*! Cou'T cf Appeals 
Plaintiff Ellis appeals from the district court's 
decision affirming an administrative denial of his application 
for disability retirement benefits. Ellis1 main contention is 
that the lower court erred in upholding the administrative 
ruling that the 1983 Utah Disability Act rather than the 1967 
Utah State Retirement Act governed his claim for disability 
benefits. We affirm the district court's judgment. 
Ellis was the head of the Provo City Attorney's Office 
for over 20 years. According to Ellis' attending physician, 
Ellis suffered numerous medical conditions stemming from the 
stressful nature of his employment. Consequently, on April 28, 
1986, Ellis applied for disability retirement benefits. He was 
not totally disabled but, rather, sought less stressful legal 
employment. 
The Utah State Retirement Board denied Ellis' application 
for disability retirement benefits finding the Legislature 
replaced the disability plan under which Ellis sought benefits, 
see Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-10-1 to -61 (1981), with an optional 
plan in 1983, £££ Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-9a-l to -15 (1984), in 
which Provo elected not to participate and under which, in any 
event, Ellis would not have qualified because he was not 
totally disabled. 
Ellis objected to the administrative denial of benefits 
and sought a formal hearing before che Board. In a hearing 
held in February 1987, the Board listened to Ellis and then 
requested Ellis to leave the room so the Board could consider 
his application. The Board denied Ellis' application for 
benefits. In response, Ellis filed a complaint in district 
court seeking a review of the Board1s decision. He claimed 
that if the Board was correct in finding the Legislature 
repealed the retirement plan under which he sought benefits, 
then this repeal was unconstitutional. Ellis also challenged 
the procedure of the Retirement Board claiming the Board failed 
to comply with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act and the 
Open and Public Meetings Act. 
The Board moved to dismiss Ellis1 complaint asserting it 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Ellis moved for summary judgment arguing that, as a matter of 
law, the 1983 enactment of the long-term disability act did not 
repeal the retirement plan under which he sought benefits. The 
court granted the Board's motion to dismiss and denied Ellis' 
motion for summary judgment. This appeal ensued. 
I. 
At the outset, we must determine whether the Legislature 
replaced the 1967 retirement program under which Ellis sought 
and qualified for disability benefits. Since this issue raises 
a question of special law, ££S Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983), we must 
determine whether the Board's decision falls within the limits 
of reasonableness or rationality. Id. 
Our analysis of whether the Legislature replaced the 
earlier retirement program is best understood against the 
background of the relevant statutory history. Between July 1, 
1967, and June 30, 1983, state retirement benefits were 
governed by the Utah State Retirement Act. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 49-10-1 to -61 (1981)• Section 49-10-28 of tho Retirement 
Act provided that a state employee was entitled to disability 
benefits provided the employee had worked at least 10 years for 
the state and a medical examination determined that the 
employee was -physically or mentally incapable of performance 
of the usual duties of his employment and should be retired and 
the administrator so recommends to the board." 
On March 10, 1983, the Legislature enacted the Utah 
Public Employees' Disability Act. 1983 Utah Laws ch. 223, § 1 
(codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-9a-l to -15 (1984)). The 
Legislature did not expressly repeal the Utah State Retirement 
Act when it enacted the Disability Act; however, the 
Legislature clearly provided that the Disability Act would 
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cover all disabilities with a date of disability on or after 
the effective date of the Act, namely July 1, 1983. 1983 Utah 
Laws ch. 223/ § 2; Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-8 (1984). Provisions 
of the Disability Act relevant to the instant case, with our 
emphasis added/ provide: 
section 49-9a-4: All employers 
participating in the Utah state retirement 
system may cover their employees under this 
act. Nothing in this act shall require any 
political subdivision or educational 
institution to be covered by this act. 
Section 49-99-8: All covered disabilities 
with a date of disability on or after the 
effective date of this act shall be 
administered under this act. Disabilities 
commencing before the effective date of this 
act shall be administered under the 
provisions of Chapter 10. Title 49. In no 
event, may a disability be covered under 
both Chapter 10, Title 49 and this act. 
Thus, in 1983 the Legislature/ by clear, express language 
provided that two disability retirement systems would co-exist 
in Utah. The earlier 1967 Retirement Act would continue to 
cover disabilities commencing before the effective date of the 
1983 Disability Act. However, all those whose disabilities 
commenced after the 1983 Disability Act became effective would 
be governed by the later Disability Act. 
In order to receive disability benefits under the 
Disability Act, the employee must be totally disabled. 
-Totally disabled- is defined by the Disability Act to mean 
-complete inability to engage in any gainful occupation which 
is reasonable, considering the employee*s education, training 
and experience.- Utah Code Ann. § 49-9a-3(10) (1984).* The 
effective date of the Disability Act was July 1, 1983. 1983 
Utah Laws ch. 223, § 2. After July 1, 1983, the Retirement 
Board refused to accept contributions for the Chapter 10, Title 
49 fund. 
1. Ellis concedes he is not -totally disabled- as defined by 
the Disability Act and, therefore, does not qualify for 
disability benefits under this statutory scheme. 
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On appeal, Ellis contends the Legislature did not 
impliedly repeal the Utah State Retirement Act when it 
subsequently enacted the Disability Act. We agree that the 
Legislature did not impliedly repeal the Retirement Act but, 
rather, by clear language, it expressly replaced the Retirement 
Act with the Disability Act for disability retirements 
commencing after the Disability Act's effective date. 
We acknowledge the authority governing implied repeals of 
legislation. As a general proposition, implied repeals are not 
favored and are found only if there is a manifest inconsistency 
or conflict between the earlier and later statutes. State v. 
Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1980). Subsequently enacted 
statutes relating to the same subject matter as previous 
statutes are, if possible, to be construed so as to make the 
later enactments harmonious with the former provisions. Stahl 
v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980). 
Nonetheless, 
[W]here a consistent body of laws cannot be 
maintained without the abrogation of a 
previous law, a repeal by implication of 
previous legislation . . . is readily found 
in the terms of the later enactment. It is 
the necessary effect of the later enactment 
construed in the light of the existing law 
that ultimately determines an implied 
repeal. . . . [W]here a conflict is readily 
seen by an application of the later 
enactment in accord with [the legislative] 
intent, it is clear that the later enactment 
is intended to supersede the existing law, 
1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.09, at 332 
(4th ed. 1985). This is so because when there is an 
irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the prior 
statutes relating to the same subject matter, the new provision 
is deemed controlling as it is the later expression of the 
Legislature. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 
1983). 
The foregoing authority, however, is inapplicable as we 
are persuaded the Legislature clearly and expressly provided 
that the Utah State Retirement Act would continue to govern 
disabilities arising before July 1, 1983, the effective date of 
the Disability Act, but all those disability retirements 
occurring thereafter would be governed by the Disability Act. 
Therefore, there is no irreconcilable conflict between the 
Retirement Act and the Disability Act as the two acts are 
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mutually exclusive. A disability is governed by one statutory 
act or the other# but not both* A consistent body of law is 
maintained and the Disability Act does not abrogate the 
Retirement Act, 
The date of Ellis* disability is April 26, 1986, i.e., 
after July 1, 1983, which is the effective date of the 
Disability Act. Consequently, the Disability Act governs 
Ellis1 disability retirement benefits. However, as previously 
mentioned, supra Note 1, Ellis is not "totally disabled" as 
required by the Disability Act. Therefore, Ellis is not 
entitled to disability benefits under the governing statutory 
scheme. 
II. 
Notwithstanding our holding that Ellis does not qualify 
for benefits under either retirement scheme, we must now 
determine whether the Legislature's replacement of the 
Retirement Act with the Disability Act unconstitutionally 
deprived Ellis of vested contractual rights. Ellis contends 
that if the Disability Act governs his eligibility for 
disability retirement benefits, then he was unconstitutionally 
denied his vested contractual rights to an earned disability 
pension. Under Utah law, Ellis' argument is without merit. 
There are two lines of authority addressing the rights of 
retired employees. One line of authority holds that a 
retirement plan is a gratuity in which the recipient has no 
vested rights and, consequently, is freely terminable at the 
employer's option. See, e,g., Kgggan v, Poarfl of Trustees/ 412 
111. 430, 107 N.E.2d 702 (1952) (retirement plans which mandate 
compulsory participation confer no vested rights upon 
recipients because statutes affording such benefits rest upon 
the sovereign power of the state and are not in the nature of 
contracts between the participant and the state); Roach v. 
State Bd. of Retirement. 331 Mass. 41, 116 N.E.2d 850 (1954) 
(holding that an employee had no vested rights to pension which 
were infringed by the repeal of the pension statute despite 
employee's eligibility for retirement prior to repeal); Dallas 
v. Trammell. 129 Tex. 150, 101 S.W.2d 1009 (1937) (public 
employee has no vested rights in a statutory pension). 
The other line of authority adheres to the contractual 
view which reasons that once a public employee has fulfilled 
all the conditions precedent to receiving retirement benefits, 
the employee has certain vested rights which cannot be impaired 
by subsequent administrative or legislative enactments. See, 
e.g., Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P,2d 541 (1965) 
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(right to public pension vests upon acceptance of public 
employment and laws of state are part of every contract); Betts 
v. Board of Admin, of the Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys^ 21 
Cal.3d 859, 148 Cal. Rptr. 158, 582 P.2d 614 (1978) (public 
employee's pension constitutes an element of compensation, and 
a vested contractual right to pension accrues upon acceptance 
of employment); In re State Employees' Pension Plan. 364 A.2d 
1228 (Del* 1976) (vested contractual rights exist under state 
pension law for those public employees who have fulfilled 
eligibility requirements); Miles v. Tennessee Consolidated 
Retirement Svs.. 548 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1977) (public employee 
has contractual right to pension benefits)• Under the 
contractual view, state legislatures may reasonably alter the 
terms or modify the retirement system to improve it or keep it 
on a sound basis prior to retirement for purposes of 
maintaining the integrity of the system. Sfifi, e.g.. Betts. 582 
P.2d at 617. Once the retirement benefits have vested, 
however, the Legislature can modify the plan only upon a 
showing that a vital state interest will be protected, Miles. 
548 S.W.2d at 305, and only where a substantial substitute is 
provided for in lieu of the loss of benefits sustained. 
Newcombe v. Ooden City Public School Teacher's Retirement 
Comm'n, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 948 (1952). 
Utah adheres to the cohtractual line of authority. In 
Drioos v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Bd., 105 Utah 417, 142 
P.2d 657 (1943), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that an 
employee who receives a mere gratuitous allowance awarded for 
appreciation of past services has no vested rights in the 
allowance and it is terminable at will. I£. at 659. On the 
other hand, when a retired employee had made the requisite 
contributions and had satisfied all conditions precedent to his 
benefits, then the employee had a -vested right" in his 
retirement benefits as provided by the statute at the time of 
his retirement and a subsequent amendment could not reduce the 
amount of benefits to which the employee was entitled. !£. at 
663-64. 
Since Driqqs, our supreme court has consistently held 
that the employee has this vested contractual right only when 
he has satisfied all conditions precedent to receiving the 
benefit, i.e., he has attained retirement age, or has been 
medically disabled. &££ Hansen v- Public Employees Retirement 
Svs, Bd. of Admin.. 122 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591, 597 (1952); 
Newcombe v. Ooden City Public School Teachers* Retirement 
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Comm'ri, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 947 (1952).2 
Based upon the foregoing authority, we are persuaded 
Ellis was not deprivedLof vested contractu^ l__beneflt.s^ Jbeg,ajise 
he failed to saTisfy the conditions precedent .to- hi^Ljdl^MIi-tY 
retirement~benef iTs, namely ""Ellis had not become disabled and 
retired before the Legislature enacted the Disability Act. 
Consequently, he was not entitled to benefits under the 
governing Disability Act. 
III. 
Ellis further contends the Retirement Board violated the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act3 by failing to comply with rule 
making procedures when it determined the Retirement Act had 
been replaced by the Disability Act in deciding Ellis' 
eligibility for disability benefits. Ellis contends that such 
a determination was, in effect, a policy determination subject 
to adequate advance notice to all affected parties, an 
2. We note, however, that Drioos was slightly modified in 
Newcombe. In Newcombe, the court held a statute which dissolved 
a statutory pension system invalid as to retired employees. 
Newcombe, 243 P.2d at 948. In dictum, however, the court 
acknowledged that had the Legislature "attempted to make changes 
in local retirement systems for the purpose of strengthening 
them, there would be no difficulty in finding authority to 
support such action." I&. at 946. To support this dictum, the 
court relied on several cases holding that vested rights of 
retired employees are not impaired by a reduction in the amount 
of the pension payments pursuant to statutes enacted subsequent 
to retirement, provided the purpose of such statutes is to 
render the retirement pension system actuarially sound. 
3. The Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-46a-l to -15 (1986), was significantly revised and amended 
in 1987, after the commencement of this action. Accordingly, 
our analysis focuses on the administrative provisions in effect 
at the time of Ellis' hearing before the Retirement Board. 
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opportunity to participate, and an opportunity to comment.4 
Any agency subject to the Administrative Rulemaking Act 
promulgating a rule must follow the procedures specified. See 
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1986) 
(interpreting the Utah Rule Making Act, the predecessor to the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act). The Administrative Rulemaking 
Act requires rule making whenever "agency actions affect a 
class of persons" and defines a rule as Ma statement made by an 
agency that applies to a general class of persons, rather than 
specific persons . . . [which] implements or interprets policy 
made by statute . . . ." Utah Code Ann. §§ 63~46a-(3)(a), 
-2(8) (1986).5 
The critical question, therefore, is whether the 
Retirement Board's decision to deny Ellis disability retirement 
benefits based upon its interpretation of the language of the 
Disability Act amounted to a rule within the meaning of the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. "We acknowledge that there is a 
variance of opinion on when an agency is engaged in rule making 
and must follow formal rule making procedures, and when an 
agency may legitimately proceed by way of adjudication." 
Williams, 720 P.2d at 776. See generally 2 K. Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 7.2 (2d ed. 1979). "Many rules 
are the product of rulemaking, and rulemaking is the part of 
the administrative process that resembles a legislature's 
enactment of a statute. An order is the product of 
adjudication, and adjudication is the part of the 
4. The Retirement Board contends that Ellis did not raise the 
applicability of the Administrative Rulemaking Act below and, 
therefore, is precluded from raising this issue for the first time 
on appeal. We disagree. The record indicates that Ellis raised 
this issue not only in his amended complaint but also in his 
motion for summary judgment. 
5. The Retirement Board argues that it is exempt from the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act because it is a •'political 
subdivision." Since the commencement of this action, the Utah 
State Retirement Act was amended and the Legislature decreed that 
the Board "shall voluntarily comply" with the provisions of the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-201(4) 
(1987). This new language implies that during the period of time 
at issue here the Board may indeed have been exempt from the Act's 
coverage. But see Utah Attorney General Informal Opinion 86-16 
(June 4, 1986), wherein Utah's Attorney General concludes that the 
Retirement Board was required to comply with the requirements of 
the Administrative Rulemaking Act. Inasmuch as we conclude that 
the Board, in any event, complied with the Act, we need not decide 
whether it was required to do so. 
a 
administrative process that resembles a court's decision of a 
case.- 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.2, at 4 (2d 
ed. 1979). 
In Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the definition of 
"rule" contained in the Utah Rule Making Act, the predecessor to 
the Administrative Rulemaking Act.6 In Williams, the 
petitioners charged the Public Service Commission with failure 
to follow proper administrative procedures in concluding that it 
did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way mobile telephone 
paging services. The supreme court held that the Commission's 
letter stating that no certificate of public convenience and 
necessity was required constituted a "rule" and, consequently, 
the Commission, when reaching this determination, should have 
followed the rule making procedures. !£. at 776. The court 
relied on three factors in reaching this conclusion. First, the 
Commission's decision was generally applicable. Second, the 
letter interpreted the scope of the Commission's statutory 
regulatory powers, thus interpreting the law within the meaning 
of the Act. Finally, in so acting, the Commission made a 
"change in clear law" by reversing its long-settled position 
regarding the scope of its jurisdiction and announcing a 
fundamental policy change. Id. 
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude the Retirement Board 
was not engaged in rule making and, therefore, did not have to 
adhere to rule making procedural requirements. Rather, the 
Board was merely applying the explicit statutory language of the 
Disability Act to the facts of Ellis' case. The explicit 
language of the Disability Act provides that that Act, not the 
Retirement Act, governs all disabilities with a date of 
disability after July 1, 1983. Ellis' date of disability is 
April 26, 1986. This administrative process does not resemble 
the Legislature's enactment of a statute. On the contrary, the 
administrative process examined here resembles a court's 
decision applying explicit statutory language. The only policy 
decision which was generally applicable was made by the 
Legislature in its enactment of the Disability Act. The change 
in clear law in this instance was promulgated by the 
Legislature, not the Retirement Board. Therefore, the 
Retirement Board was not compelled to follow the rule making 
procedures of the Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
6. The court stated that its conclusion would not be any 
different had the court been called upon to interpret the 
definition of "rule" within the meaning of the subsequently 
enacted Administrative Rulemaking Act. Williams. 720 P.2d at 
775 n.7. 
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IV. 
The final issue we address is whether the Retirement Board 
violated the Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1981)# when it requested Ellis to leave the 
room while it deliberated his appeal from the administrative 
denial of benefits. 
The Open and Public Meetings Act requires that every 
"meeting" of a "public body" be open to the public. As used in 
this Act, "public body" means "any administrative, advisory, 
executive or legislative body of the state or its political 
subdivisions which consists of two or more persons that expends, 
disburses or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue and 
which is vested with the authority to make decisions regarding 
the publicfs business." Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2(2) (1981). 
We are persuaded that the Open and Public Meetings Act is 
not applicable to the Retirement Board. First, the Utah State 
Retirement Fund is administered as a common trust fund and not 
supported by tax revenue. Second, the Retirement Board is not 
vested with authority to make decisions regarding the public's 
business. The Board administers funds for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries and not for the public at large. Hansen v. Utah 
State Retirement Bd.. 652 P.2d 1332, 1338 (Utah 1982). When' 
Hansen was decided, "[s]ome 80 percent of the beneficiaries 
[were] not state employees, but employees of municipalities or 
counties." Id. "No state funds [were] appropriated to meet any 
administrative costs." id, Ellis' argument that the Board 
acted contrary to the Open and Public Meetings Act is without 
merit. 
Affirmed. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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